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We use the 2015-2016 waves of the UK Household Longitudinal Study (Understanding 
Society) to look at subjective wellbeing around the time of the June 2016 EU membership 
Referendum in the UK (Brexit). We employ measures of both evaluative and affective 
wellbeing, namely life satisfaction and mental distress respectively. We find that those 
reporting lower life satisfaction in 2015 were more likely to express a preference for leaving 
the EU in 2016, while mental distress was less predictive of pro-Brexit attitudes. Post-
Referendum, those with Leave preferences enjoyed an increase in life satisfaction but there 
was no change in average life satisfaction in the overall sample. In contrast, the average 
level of mental distress increased in the sample post-Brexit with no significant difference 
between those preferring to remain in or to leave the EU. We test the robustness of our 
results by considering a number of potential caveats, such as sample selection, unobserved 
individual fixed effects or the interval between interviews. Overall, our results suggest that 
levels of subjective wellbeing may both be a cause and a result of the 2016 Brexit vote. 
 
Keywords: life satisfaction, mental distress, Brexit, United Kingdom, democracy .  








The Referendum on EU membership held in the UK on the 23rd of June 2016 yielded an outcome 
that the betting markets thought had only a 20% chance of occurring: A majority of voters in a 
record turnout (72.2%) voted for the UK to leave the EU (The Electoral Commission, 2017). The 
inability of pollsters and betting markets to anticipate this outcome first raises the question of 
whether there are additional indicators of voter preferences, and, second, whether this unexpected 
shock to long-run economic and social opportunities differentially affected groups of individuals 
in the UK. We here analyse Understanding Society panel data (UK Household Longitudinal 
Study, UKHLS) to identify which individuals expressed preferences for leaving the EU, and how 
the referendum outcome affected different groups, particularly in terms of life satisfaction. 
 
Life satisfaction has previously been shown to be useful in predicting electoral outcomes, with 
Ward (2015) finding that, across 126 European elections since 1972, the life satisfaction of the 
population before an election had twice the predictive power for the share of votes for the 
incumbent political parties than that of GDP per capita. Liberini et al. (2017) equally show, using 
data from the UK BHPS 1996-2008, that low life satisfaction reduced the probability of voting 
for the government of the day, even when the lower levels of life satisfaction reflected events that 
were unlikely to be related to politics, such as the death of a spouse. They also uncover substantial 
differences in the baseline life satisfaction of voters of different parties, although this difference 
varies from election to election. Based on around 1,500 respondents in the 2000 American 
National Election Study, Flavin and Keane (2012) find that those with higher life satisfaction 
were substantially more likely to vote and participate politically: Moving from not very satisfied 




We extend these previous contributions by looking at the determinants of the attitudes towards 
one specific question asked in a referendum – namely, the 2016 British referendum on EU 
membership. We then follow this up by attempting to estimate the effect of the Referendum 
outcome itself on individuals’ subsequent subjective wellbeing (SWB) – and in particular their 
overall life satisfaction and usual level of mental distress. As such, we hope to be able to address 
some of the important questions regarding individual preferences for leaving the EU: Can SWB 
scores partly explain the differences in preferences for EU membership before the Referendum? 
What were the wellbeing differences between those preferring Remain or Leave following the 
Referendum result? Do the effects of Brexit on life satisfaction and mental health differ when 
people live in UK regions in which there are more people who share their preferences for EU 
membership? 
 
We establish the wellbeing consequences of the EU Referendum by appealing to the same 
research design as in Metcalfe et al. (2011). For the study to be thought of as a quasi-experiment, 
the timing of the EU Referendum has to be largely randomly assigned in terms of the UKHLS 
interviews. Although the date of the EU Referendum was fixed, the dates on which individuals 
were interviewed in 2016 were independent of the EU Referendum (for a discussion of the sample 
design see Lynn, 2009; Buck and McFall, 2012). This enables us to conduct a pre-post comparison 
test of the EU Referendum result in order to see whether the change in average SWB from before 
to after the Referendum date of June 23rd 2016 was different for different groups of people.  
 
In the UKHLS sample, we show that a one-year lag of life satisfaction is weakly associated with 
preferences for remaining in the EU. We find little evidence that life satisfaction and mental distress 
are statistically significantly different between people who reported a preference for remaining in 
the EU (Remainers) and those who reported a preference for leaving the EU (Leavers) prior to 
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the Referendum. However, we find a rise of approximately 0.1 points in the life satisfaction of those 
who expressed a preference for leaving the EU following the referendum. In addition, those who 
expressed a preference for remaining in the EU reported, on average, significantly lower mental 
wellbeing post the 2016 EU Referendum. Hence, there is some evidence that those who preferred 
leaving the EU became significantly more satisfied with their lives following the Brexit vote, while 
those who preferred to remain in the EU became worse off in terms of their usual mental state. 
Nevertheless, given that relatively more people wanted to leave than to remain in the EU in the days 
following the Referendum, it is possible that the post-Referendum increase in Leavers’ wellbeing is 
merely a reflection of a shift in people’s preferences as a result of knowing the Referendum outcome. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some background on the Brexit vote 
and the relevant subjective wellbeing literature. Section 3 describes the data and analytical method, while 




There is a dearth of literature on political participation, in the form of elections and referenda, 
and subjective wellbeing. Participation in referenda in Switzerland has been found to be 
positively associated with SWB (Frey and Stutzer, 2000), suggesting that individuals’ sense of 
political autonomy and the process utility of expressing preferences may be good for their 
wellbeing, or, alternatively, that individuals tend to vote for policies that are wellbeing-
enhancing. 
 
However, referenda are relatively rare in the UK and the 2016 Referendum was only the second 
time that voters had been asked about EU membership, after a large majority of 67.2% of voters 
elected to remain in the European Community in 1975 (Saunders, 2016). Since that time, 
attitudes towards EU membership have been fairly volatile in the UK (Clarke, Goodwin and 
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Whiteley, 2017), culminating in the electorate’s decision on June 23rd 2016 to leave the EU. This 
decision was however taken by a considerably smaller majority than that in the 1975 
Referendum, with 51.9% voting Leave vs. 48.1% voting Remain. Researchers are still debating 
the reasons for the Leave votes, with some blaming the austerity policies that followed the 2008 
financial crisis (Dorling, 2016), a cultural backlash against progressive value changes (Inglehart 
and Norris, 2016), missing information from the government about the economic consequences 
of Brexit (Welfens, 2016), or socio-economic background and identity politics (NatCen Social 
Research, 2016). It has also been argued that referenda provide an opportunity between regular 
elections for the electorate to express dissatisfaction with the incumbent government (Ryan, 
2016), so that they become a protest vote (Kostadinova, 2017).  
 
Overall, it appears that demographic background is a better predictor of Brexit voting decisions 
than are economic variables (Matti and Zhou, 2016). Post-Referendum analyses have suggested 
that those who were more likely to vote Leave were, on average, older, more likely to live in 
social housing, have no formal education and have lower incomes, and were less likely to belong 
to a minority (NatCen Social Research, 2016; O’Reilly et al., 2016). In our work here, we will 
add to this debate by investigating whether pre-Referendum subjective wellbeing significantly 
predicts preferences over EU membership. It is possible that protest voting in the Referendum is 
reflected in Leavers’ lower subjective wellbeing scores prior to the Referendum date. 
 
The main focus of our study is on the wellbeing consequences of the Brexit Referendum 
outcome. To this end, we ask whether the Referendum itself affected post-Referendum 
subjective wellbeing, and to what extent these wellbeing effects differ between those with 
preferences for Leave vs. Remain. We further investigate whether the Brexit wellbeing effects 
were moderated by the local percentage of those who voted in a way reflecting the respondent’s 
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own preferences. This last moderating effect is along the lines of the social-norm effects of 
others’ unemployment on the wellbeing of the unemployed in Clark (2003) and Powdthavee 
(2007). 
 
Despite economists’ predictions of the dire short- and long-term economic consequences of a 
winning Leave vote (e.g., Dhingra et al., 2016), aside from the sharp fall in the Pound, the 
predicted immediate economic recession has so far failed to appear (Johnson and Mitchell, 
2017). Thus, any short-term impact of Brexit on SWB cannot be ascribed solely to sharp changes 
in economic circumstances. Regardless of macroeconomic conditions, individuals report higher 
levels of happiness when their preferred political party is in power (Di Tella and MacCulloch, 
2005). Did those with a preference for Leave, who were the ‘winners’ of the EU Referendum, 
similarly experience increased SWB after the Referendum? We will explore this question below. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Data and variables 
 
Our main dataset comes from Waves 7 and 8 of the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS; 
also known as Understanding Society). The data are early-release data which were made 
available to us by the survey institute following an application for early access (ISER, 2017). 
The Wave 8 sample contains only observations that were collected in 2016, and thus constitutes 
about 50% of the full Wave 8 dataset that will be released to researchers in the autumn of 2018 
(the full dataset will also contain the 2017 data). We include respondents in our final sample 
who answered the question about EU membership preference. This produces an unbalanced, 
two-wave panel sample with 35,378 observations across two waves. However, not all 
respondents reported their SWB scores and there are also some missing observations for self-
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rated health and household income. As we are comparing the same individuals across waves, 
and so do not use the full sample, we do not employ sampling weights. Some of our socio-
demographic variables were only asked of respondents when they first joined the panel and are 
therefore derived from Waves 1-6 of the UKHLS.  
 
We employ two outcome variables to assess pre- and post-Referendum wellbeing in the UK. 
The first is self-reported life satisfaction, which is a measure of a person’s thoughts about his or 
her life. The exact wording of the life satisfaction is “All things considered, how satisfied or 
dissatisfied are you with your life overall using a 1-7 scale? 1 = very dissatisfied, …, 7 = very 
satisfied”. The second wellbeing measure is derived from the General Health Questionnaire or 
GHQ-12 (Goldberg 1978). In the wellbeing literature, this scale is considered to be a good proxy 
for an individual’s usual level of mental stress and strain. Respondents indicate on a 4-point 
scale, ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 4 (Much more than usual), how often over the last few weeks 
they: been able to concentrate, had lost sleep over worry, felt constantly under strain, felt they 
could not overcome difficulties, been feeling unhappy and depressed, been losing confidence, 
and been feeling like a worthless person. Individuals were also asked to indicate on a 4-point 
scale ranging from 1 (More so than usual) to 4 (Much less than usual) how often over the past 
few weeks they: had felt that they were playing a useful part in things, felt capable of making 
decisions, been able to enjoy day-to-day activities, been able to face up to problems, and been 
feeling reasonably happy. We use the Caseness score of the GHQ-12, which counts the number 
of times (out of 12) the individual selected a response that indicated poorer mental health. This 
is the SCGHQ2_DV variable in the UKHLS data, with a scale ranging from 0 (best mental 
wellbeing) to 12 (worst mental wellbeing). The life-satisfaction measure has been shown in the 
SWB literature to reflect the cognitive (or evaluative) dimension of wellbeing, as opposed to 




There is little indication in the existing literature as to which dimensions of SWB (between 
evaluative and affective wellbeing) should be affected more by the EU Referendum result. 
According to Kahneman and Deaton (2010), life evaluation – which, similar to life satisfaction, 
is an evaluative measure that relates more to one’s life goals – has been found to be sensitive to 
individual socio-economic variables such as income and labour-force status. In contrast, 
measures of usual states of emotional wellbeing – an affective dimension of SWB that relates 
more to one’s immediate or usual conditions and experiences – have been found to be sensitive 
to circumstances that evoke emotional responses, such as time spent commuting and caring for 
others. To the extent that the news of the Brexit result is more correlated with individual 
opportunities in life and long-term life goals, it will likely produce a significant change in life 
satisfaction, with the direction of the impact depending on whether the individual prefers to 
remain in or leave the EU. On the other hand, provided that the news does not affect the 
immediate or usual circumstances and experiences, we do not expect to observe a large 
correlation between the Brexit result and respondents’ usual mental states. 
 
Respondents were only asked about their preferences for EU membership in Wave 8 of the 
UKHLS, for which we have the responses that were collected between January and December 
2016. More specifically, they were asked: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the 
European Union or leave the European Union?” It should be pointed out that the responses to 
this question do not indicate whether the respondent intended to vote in the EU Referendum or, 
for surveys collected after 23rd June 2016, whether they did actually vote in the Referendum, 
and, if so, whether their stated preference matched their actual vote. In our final Wave 8 sample, 
51.9% of respondents expressed a preference for remaining in the EU, while 39.4% favoured 
Leave, 4.3% selected ‘Don’t know’ and 4.4% refused to answer the question. Although the 
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UKHLS constitutes a representative sample of the UK population, these percentages do not 
match the actual Referendum outcome of 51.9% Leave vs. 48.1% Remain. It is possible that 
some UKHLS respondents did not vote in the actual Referendum or changed their minds 
between the date of the survey and the day of the Referendum. Unfortunately, we do not have 
information on whether respondents actually voted. However, it has been reported that voter 
turnout was higher in areas with greater support for the Leave campaign (Goodwin and Heath, 
2016). 
 
Our analysis further includes socio-demographic control variables that have previously been 
shown to be associated with SWB and at the same time are potential predictors of being selected 
into the treatment group, including gender, age, marital status, employment status, level of 
education, number of children and income (see Layard, Clark and Senik, 2012). As individuals 
may have been interviewed at different times and with different methods of data collection across 
these two waves, we also include the month of the interview in both waves, and the interview 
method (e.g., face-to-face, telephone, or online) as additional control variables. In an attempt to 
allow for any sharp changes in the economic sentiment post-Referendum, we account for daily 
exchange rates (GB£/US$) in each SWB regression, as well as monthly UK share-price indices1, 
which are calculated from the prices of common shares of companies traded on national or 
foreign stock exchanges.    
 
To best pick up socio-economic standing, our measure of income consists of respondents’ 
average log monthly income over UKHLS Waves 1-6 (if available). The descriptive statistics 
for all measures are reported in Table 1A in the Appendix. The regional dummy variables are 
local authority districts (LADs). We matched the LADs in the dataset to the Referendum results 
                                               




for each LAD published by the Electoral Commission (The Electoral Commission, 2017).2 We 
use this information to construct a dummy variable indicating whether respondents live in an 
LAD in which the majority of voters at the time of the Referendum shared the preference for 
continued EU membership that the individual expressed in their UKHLS interview. 
 
3.2.  Econometric method 
 
Our main equation to examine the pre-post comparison of the June 2016 Referendum focuses 
on the SWB of individual i at time t (SWBit): 
 
!"#$% = ' + )*+,-./0123$ + )4123	6278% + )9[+,-./0123$ × 123	6278%] 
																															+	=$%> + ?$ + @$% , 
            (1) 
where +,-./0123$ is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the individual was interviewed 
at least one day after the EU Referendum in Wave 8 of the UKHLS (i.e., from June 24th 2016 
onwards), and 0 if the person was interviewed up to one day before the Referendum (i.e. from 
January 1st 2016 to June 22nd 2016); 123	6278 is a dummy variable for being interviewed in Wave 
8, i.e. in 2016, the year of the EU Referendum; xit is a vector of control variables; ?$ is the 
individual fixed effects; and @$% denotes time-varying random shocks. The parameter )* thus 
captures the baseline difference in SWB (in Wave 7) between the people whose Wave 8 
interview was before or after the 2016 EU Referendum; the parameter )4 captures the wave 
effect (the average change in wellbeing between 2016 and 2015). 
 
                                               
2 The Referendum results for Northern Ireland were only published for Northern Ireland overall and not reported 
separately by LAD. 
12 
 
Our main assumptions are that the outcome of the Brexit vote was unknown, as well as largely 
unanticipated, prior to the Referendum date, and that in the absence of the EU Referendum 
!"#$% would have changed identically for the pre- and post-EU Referendum groups between 
Waves 7 and 8 – simply because the interview dates are randomised across individuals in each 
survey year (Lynn, 2009; Buck and McFall, 2012)3. The parameter )9 will then represent the 
pre-post Brexit result differences in SWB of those interviewed in Wave 8 from June 23rd 2016 
onward. More formally, in the absence of treatment, )9 would be statistically insignificantly 
different from zero: in the absence of Brexit, pre- and post-EU Referendum SWB should be the 
same in Wave 8 of the UKHLS as it was in any other wave (Meyer, 1995). In this case, an 
unbiased estimator of )9 can be obtained from pre-post difference as: 
 















Note that the fixed effects, ?$, are naturally cancelled out in this pre-post comparison 
specification.4 We also dissect the pre-post estimate of the Brexit vote by individual preferences 




!"#$% = ' + )*+,-./0123$ + )4123	6278% + )9[+,-./0123$ × 123	6278%] + 
																															)V T$
U + )H 	[+,-./0123$ × T$
U] + )F 	[123	6278% × T$
U] + 
																															)W 	[+,-./0123$ × 123	6278% × T$
U] + 	=$%> + ?$ + @$% ,    (3) 
                                               
3 Since the start of the UKHLS, fieldwork decisions led to moving interview dates for some households between 
months across different survey waves, although they always remained in the same quarter.  
4 However, it is possible that the OLS and fixed effects (FE) estimators of such model may be different in an 
unbalanced panel when there is time varying panel non-response (Lechner, Rodriguez-Planas and Fernández Kranz, 




U represents the baseline coefficient of individual EU preferences, )H
U  the baseline 
differences in SWB by EU preferences for people interviewed post-EU Referendum in 2016,  )F
U  
the coefficient of being interviewed in the Referendum year by EU preferences, and )W
U  the pre-
post Brexit vote difference in SWB by EU preferences for people who were interviewed from 
June 24rd 2016 onwards. Our hypothesis here is that the news of the Brexit result may have had a 
different pre-post outcome in terms of individual wellbeing, depending on whether the respondent 
favoured remaining in or leaving the EU. We vary the outcome variable in different 
specifications (life satisfaction and GHQ-12), and also perform separate analyses for different 
sub-groups. Note also that robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are reported 
in all tables. 
 
4. Analyses 
4.1. Main results 
 
We start with the question: What predicts preferences for Brexit? To make a first pass at this 
question, we first estimate in Table 1 a probit regression with the dependent variable taking the 
value of 1 if the individual expressed a preference for Brexit (i.e., Leave the EU) and 0 otherwise. 
Our sample here consists of all individuals who answered this EU-preference question in Wave 
8. While we control for many of the personal characteristics measured in Wave 8, our main 
independent variables of interest are the life satisfaction and mental stress the respondent reported 
in Wave 7. 
 
This simple probit analysis is, of course, not causal. However, while the linear relationship 
between lagged life satisfaction and the individual’s preference for Leave is only marginally 
significant (Column 1), the results in Column 2 suggest that particularly low life satisfaction in 
14 
 
year t-1 (1-4 on the 1-7 scale) does predict preferences for Brexit in year t, even when controlling 
for income, job, other socio-economic characteristics, and regional fixed effects. This is 
consistent with recent work by Liberini et al. (2017) who also find evidence that unhappy feelings 
significantly contributed to Brexit in the UKHLS. On the other hand, lagged mental health does 
not appear to exert as strong an influence on an individual’s preference for Brexit, holding lagged 
life satisfaction and other socio-economic status variables constant.  
 
Though not reported in the table, the estimated coefficients on the other variables show that men 
are more likely than women to prefer leaving the EU. There is also a hump-shape in age in 
preferences for Brexit, although the age coefficients are not statistically significantly different 
from zero. Those who are married, cohabiting or divorced are statistically-significantly more 
likely to be pro-Brexit than the never married; the same holds for retirees, people with poor health 
and those with lower education. There is also evidence that those with higher long-term income, 
as measured by their average log monthly household income in the first six waves of the UKHLS, 
are significantly less likely to want to leave the EU. These estimates can be supplied on request. 
 
Did the result of the EU Referendum then raise or lower average SWB in the UK in 2016? 
Columns 1 and 3 of Table 2 take a first look at this question by estimating Eq. (1) via OLS on 
self-reported life satisfaction and mental distress. In the life-satisfaction regression in Column 1, 
the estimated coefficient on the interaction between “Interviewed Post-EU Referendum” and 
“Referendum year” is negative, but very small and not statistically-significantly different from 
zero: the interaction coefficient is -0.06 with a robust standard error of 0.072. The Brexit 
referendum result did not seem to have had a significant average effect on life satisfaction for 
those who were interviewed from June 24th 2016 onwards. On the other contrary, the mental-
distress regression in Column 3 reveals a notable rise in average mental stress following the EU 
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Referendum that is marginally statistically significant at the 10% level: here, the interaction 
coefficient is 0.285 with a robust standard error of 0.154. This is approximately 10% of the 
standard deviation in the mental distress scale. 
 
The lack of an average pre-post difference in people’s SWB does not mean that no-one was 
significantly affected by the Referendum outcome. It is plausible that the pre-post wellbeing 
differences vary by the respondent’s own preference regarding the outcome. In order to test this 
formally, we introduce an interaction by EU-membership preference in the life-satisfaction 
equation, as in Eq. (2). The resulting estimates for life satisfaction and mental stress appear in 
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2, respectively. 
 
In this three-way interaction model, the interaction term between “Interviewed Post-EU 
Referendum” and “Referendum year” continues to be negative and statistically insignificant in 
the life satisfaction regression (Column 2). However, the same interaction term gains more 
statistical significance in the mental-distress regression (Column 4): the interaction coefficient is 
0.331, with a robust standard error of 0.160. There is thus a statistically well-determined rise in 
the mental distress of those who preferred to remain in the EU following the Brexit vote in Wave 
8.  
 
The estimated coefficient on the interaction term between “Interviewed Post-EU Referendum” 
and “Preference for leaving the EU” is statistically insignificantly different from zero: prior to the 
EU Referendum, the life satisfaction and mental distress of those expressing a preference for 
Brexit was not statistically different to that of those expressing a preference to remain in the EU. 
Moreover, the baseline effect of “Interviewed Post-EU Referendum” is positive in the life-
satisfaction regression and negative in the mental distress regression, but statistically 
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insignificantly different from zero, thus implying that there was no notable change in SWB levels 
– neither for life satisfaction nor mental distress – from before to after the Referendum date for 
those who preferred continued EU membership. 
 
We now shift our attention to the estimated pre-post difference from the Brexit vote on the post-
EU Referendum SWB among those who preferred Leave. Here, we can see from the 3-way 
interaction term between “Interviewed Post-EU Referendum”, “Referendum year” and “Leave 
the EU” that the Brexit vote effect on the life satisfaction of people who preferred to leave the EU 
is positive and statistically well-determined: the 3-way interaction coefficient is 0.104, with a 
robust standard error of 0.048. On the other hand, the same 3-way interaction coefficient is 
negative but statistically insignificant in the mental-stress regression: the fall in average mental 
stress among those who preferred Brexit following the EU Referendum is not statistically 
significant. 
 
In summary, the three-way interaction results suggest that there is a significant improvement in 
terms of evaluative wellbeing – as measured by life satisfaction – after the Referendum date for 
people who preferred to leave the EU compared to those who preferred to remain in the EU, while 
average mental distress rose post-Referendum for those who reported being anti-Brexit.   
 
We conduct further analyses in Table 3 by introducing another moderating variable into the 
regression equation: a dummy variable that denotes whether the respondent lives in an area where 
the majority of Referendum voters shared their own EU preference (i.e. they “won”). This is to 
test the hypothesis that the wellbeing effect of the Brexit result is significantly moderated by 




Looking across the columns, we can still see that the Brexit effect on life satisfaction continues 
to be positive though only marginally significant for people who preferred leaving the EU, and 
that there is still a heightening of mental stress among people who preferred to remain in the EU 
post-Referendum. However, there is no evidence that the 3-way interaction term for either SWB 
measure is significantly moderated by living in an area where own EU preference won. There do 
not then seem to be social-context effects in the well-being consequences of the EU Referendum.        
 
One question of interest is whether the Brexit effects for Leavers and Remainers appeared 
immediately following the Referendum result, and how long did they last? To answer, we look at 
the effects on SWB 0-2, 3-4, and 5 months or more after the Referendum. These new estimates 
appear in Table 4.  
 
Instead of revealing a sharp and statistically-significant increase in life satisfaction among 
Leavers immediately following the Referendum, our results show that the positive Brexit vote 
effect only becomes statistically well-determined five months after the Referendum (Column 1 in 
Table 4). In addition, we document some evidence of a noticeable drop in the average life 
satisfaction of people who preferred to remain in the EU between two and four months after the 
Referendum; the interaction term between “Interviewed between 24/08/2016 and 23/10/2016” 
and “Year = 2016” is -0.233, with a robust standard error of 0.115. This estimated effect then 
becomes statistically insignificant five months after the Brexit vote.  
 
With respect to mental stress, there is an immediate worsening for those who preferred to remain 
in the EU post-Referendum. The heightening of Remainers’ average mental stress appears to be 




Finally, we conduct sub-sample analyses by gender and age groups, as shown in Table 5: it is 
men and the over-40s who preferred to leave the EU who derive the most satisfaction from the 
Brexit vote. In addition, we also find that women and the over-40s who preferred to remain in the 




One concern is that because the question concerning support for Leave versus Remain is asked in 
only one wave (W8) spanning all of 2016, it is possible that people’s attitudes may have already 
changed in consideration of the Referendum outcome. For example, post-Referendum, it may 
become significantly less stigmatising for people to admit that they prefer to leave the EU. 
Moreover, people may simply change their preferences from wanting to remain in the EU to 
wanting to leave the EU after the Brexit vote. In order to test whether there is selection into the 
treatment group (i.e. interviewed from June 24th 2016 onwards), we estimate in Appendix Table 
2A a probit regression in which the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the individual was 
interviewed after the Referendum date and 0 otherwise. Consistent with the idea that people may 
have changed their attitudes in consideration of the Referendum result, we find that significantly 
more people who preferred Brexit were interviewed post-Referendum than pre-Referendum. 
Unfortunately, little can be done to effectively solve this endogeneity issue, mainly because the 
announcement of the EU Referendum date was made by then-Prime Minister David Cameron 
only on February 20th 2016.5 It is also the reason why we cannot call our pre-post estimates as 
difference-in-difference (DD) estimates as the outcome of the referendum affects both treatment 
and control groups. As a result, care must be taken when interpreting the effect of the Brexit vote 
                                               
5 The only viable solution to this problem is for us to travel back in time – possibly with a time-machine – so that the 
same “preference for EU” question could be posed to all individuals in 2015 (W7). Unfortunately, our combined 




on the wellbeing of people who expressed a preference for leaving the EU post-Referendum in 
that the positive effect of Brexit on Leavers’ life satisfaction may simply be reflecting people’s 
changes in preferences and attitudes towards leaving the EU. Nevertheless, it is also worth noting 
here that significantly fewer respondents reported to have no preference (the “Don’t know” group) 
post-Referendum as well, which may reveal that admitting pro-Brexit preferences was more 
socially acceptable post-Referendum.  
 
Second, the same treatment effect can probably still be observed had another date been used to 
generate the treatment group, i.e., one that is not the actual EU Referendum date of June 23rd 2016 
(those in the treatment group were interviewed from June 24th 2016 onwards). We address this 
issue by conducting a number of placebo tests, the results of which appear in Appendix Table 3A. 
The first, in Columns 1 and 4 in Table 3A, uses June 24th 2015 as the cut-off date to generate the 
treatment group to be used on the sample from Waves 6 and 7. The second and third placebo tests, 
in Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 in Table 3A, use June 24th 2016 to generate the treatment group, but 
apply it to two earlier samples – namely, a Waves 6 -7 sample and a Waves 5-6 sample. Across 
all of the columns, the estimated interaction terms, including the 3-way interaction coefficients, 
are small in size and statistically insignificant. This gives us some reassurance that the wellbeing 
effects from the Brexit vote that we observed post-Referendum in earlier tables are genuine and 
not due to chance. 
 
Third, it might be argued that the unobserved individual fixed effects many continue to bias the 
estimates when an unbalanced panel is used in the estimation (Lechner, Rodriguez-Planas and 
Fernández Kranz, 2016). As a check, we re-estimate Eq.2 using both OLS and Fixed Effects (FE) 
estimators on a two-wave balanced panel and report the results in Appendix Table 4A. The 
balanced-panel OLS estimates here are qualitatively similar in terms of coefficient size and 
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statistical significance to those in the unbalanced panel (in Columns 2 and 4 of Table 2). Naturally, 
the FE coefficients are imprecisely estimated compared to those from OLS, yet they remain 
remarkably similar in terms of size and sign to the OLS estimates. We then conclude that attrition 
is ignorable for the pre-post estimation in our data.    
 
Fourth, one objection to our results could be that the time intervals between waves are not constant 
across individuals. For example, people who were interviewed in September 2015 may have been 
re-interviewed again only in December 2016 instead of September 2016. According to the 
description of the UKHLS sample design (e.g., Lynn, 2009; Buck and McFall, 2012), a great deal 
of effort was taken by the survey institute to keep subsequent interviews within the same quarter. 
This seems to be the case when we take a closer look at the data: 37% of individuals in Wave 7 
were re-interviewed in the same month in Wave 8 (e.g., in January 2015 and then in January 
2016); 39% were re-interviewed in Wave 8 only one month away from their month of interview 
in Wave 7; and 12% were re-interviewed in Wave 8 only two months away from their Wave-7 
interview month. In any case, the month of interview for both years is controlled for in all 
regressions. We are further able to show, in Appendix Table 5A, that qualitatively-similar results 
are obtained if we redefine the treatment group so that the cut-off date is June 24th 2016 for 
individuals interviewed in Wave 8, and June 24th 2015 for individuals interviewed in Wave 7.   
 
Finally, one question of interest is in what specific way the EU Referendum result affected the 
mental health of people who preferred to remain in the EU. To answer this question, the GHQ-12 
can be unpacked, with separate regressions run on each of its components. This should give us an 
idea of the principal conduits through which well-being fell. The results, in Appendix Table 6A, 
show that the Brexit Referendum result on Remainers’ mental stress is positive and statistically 
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significant at the 5% level for six of the twelve GHQ-12 components, and thus works via a number 
of different routes, defying easy categorisation. 
    
5. Conclusions 
 
We analysed the SWB determinants of preferences for Brexit in the UK in 2016, as well as the 
subjective wellbeing effects of the outcome of the Referendum on EU membership held in June 
of that year. We found that those who reported lower levels of life satisfaction in 2015 were more 
likely to express preferences for Leave, while mental distress in 2015 was not as strong a predictor 
of pro-Brexit attitudes in 2016. 
 
At the individual level, the referendum outcome produced a noticeable windfall satisfaction gain 
amongst Leavers compared to Remainers. At the level of the UK as a whole though, the effects 
of the Brexit vote on life satisfaction were statistically insignificant and close to zero. The average 
level of mental distress in our sample increased after the EU Referendum, though only by 0.1 of 
a standard deviation and only significant at the 10% level. In contrast to the results found for life 
satisfaction, the Brexit vote effect on mental health did not differ between Remainers and Leavers. 
 
In conclusion, SWB does have some predictive power of people’s preferences for Brexit, 
especially evaluative wellbeing which was assessed in the form of life satisfaction in our study. 
The life-satisfaction impact of the Referendum outcome differs significantly by the individual’s 
stated EU membership preference, but this is not the case for mental distress. We have also 
repeated our analysis with the preliminary sampling weights supplied by the survey institute – 
See Table 7A in the Appendix -- and, subsequently, not all of our significant coefficients remained 
so. However, this may be due to the significant loss in the number of observations; we lose around 
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12,000 observations (or 67% of the whole sample) when the sampling weight is applied. It would 
be interesting to follow the subjective wellbeing trajectories of both Remainers and Leavers over 
a number of years to assess the potential long-term SWB consequences of this historic 
Referendum. Despite huge disappointment on the side of Remainers and elation on the side of 
Leavers, it is likely that the Brexit vote itself, in the end, will not permanently affect life 
satisfaction as the latter captures individuals’ evaluations of many different domains of their lives 
(e.g. health, family, finances, etc.), many of which have not (yet) been affected by the Referendum 
result. However, with the date of EU withdrawal approaching fast, life satisfaction and mental 
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Table 1: Predicting preference for leaving the EU before the Referendum in 2016: Probit regressions 
 
VARIABLES 
Preference for Leave (=1) 
(1) (2) 
Life satisfaction in 2015 -0.017*  
 (0.009)  
Mental distress: GHQ-12 in 2015 -0.008*  
 (0.005)  
High life satisfaction (5-7) in 2015    -0.095*** 
  (0.028) 
High mental distress (10-12) in 2015  -0.003 
  (0.062) 
Regional dummies (14) Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0593  0.0596 
Observations 14,633 14,633 
  
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Dependent variable is derived from the question: “Should the United Kingdom remain a 
member of the European Union or leave the European Union?” No=0; Yes=1. Life satisfaction is derived from 
the question: All things considered, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your life overall using a 1-7 
scale?” 1 = very dissatisfied, …, 7 = very satisfied. GHQ-12 is 0-12 scale of individual’s usual level of mental 
distress, with a scale ranging from 0 (best mental wellbeing) to 12 (worst mental wellbeing). Other controls 
include gender, age, age-squared, age-cubed, marital status, employment status, self-rated health, highest completed 
education, average log monthly household income (waves 1-6), and number of children aged 16 and under. Sample taken 




Table 2: Subjective wellbeing and the Brexit effect: Linear pre-post comparison regressions 
(UKHLS, 2015-2016): OLS regressions 
 
 Life satisfaction Mental distress 
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Interviewed post-EU Referendum in W8 
(=1) -0.014 0.002 0.001 -0.011 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.072) (0.081) 
Referendum year (=1) -0.029 -0.021 0.002 -0.019 
 (0.046) (0.049) (0.096) (0.101) 
Interviewed post-EU Ref in W8 × Ref 
year -0.060 -0.115 0.285* 0.331** 
 (0.072) (0.075) (0.154) (0.160) 
Preference towards EU     
Leave the EU -0.012 -0.023 -0.089** -0.100 
 (0.017) (0.032) (0.036) (0.067) 
Don't know 0.052 0.042 -0.191** -0.255** 
 (0.040) (0.060) (0.084) (0.117) 
Refusal/missing -0.031 0.022 -0.144 -0.058 
 (0.051) (0.076) (0.104) (0.169) 
2-way interaction terms     
Post-EU Ref × Leave the EU  -0.027  0.017 
  (0.042)  (0.085) 
Post-EU Ref × Don't know  -0.026  0.176 
  (0.109)  (0.237) 
Post-EU Ref × Refusal/missing  -0.096  -0.013 
  (0.109)  (0.109) 
Ref year × Leave the EU  -0.005  0.044 
  (0.036)  (0.073) 
Ref year × Don't know  -0.011  0.054 
  (0.067)  (0.130) 
Ref year x Refusal/missing  -0.183  0.036 
  (0.122)  (0.257) 
3-way interaction terms     
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Leave the 
EU  0.104**  -0.074 
  (0.048)  (0.098) 
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Don't know  0.146  -0.079 
  (0.132)  (0.277) 
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × 
Refusal/missing  0.321*  -0.523 
  (0.178)  (0.362) 
Observations 35,378 35,378 35,289 35,289 
R-squared 0.189 0.189 0.179 0.179 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. See Table 1’s note for a discussion on life 
satisfaction and mental distress. Control variables include gender, age, age-squared, age-cubed, employment, education, 
marital status, average of log monthly income (W1-6), number of children, daily exchange rate (£/US$), monthly share 
prices, month of the interview, interview mode dummies (i.e., face-to-face, telephone or online) and regional fixed 
effects. No sampling weight was used in the regression. 
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Table 3: Does living in an area where own EU preference achieved a majority reinforce or mitigate 







Living in an area where own EU preference won   -0.018 0.056 
 (0.043) (0.091) 
2-way interaction terms   
Post-EU Ref × Ref year -0.109 0.385** 
 (0.082) (0.176) 
3-way interaction terms   
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Leave the EU 0.153* -0.044 
 (0.080) (0.161) 
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Living in an area 
where own EU preference won   0.022 -0.135 
 (0.064) (0.132) 
4-way interaction terms   
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Leave the EU × 
Living in an area where own EU preference won   -0.088 0.039 
 (0.103) (0.209) 
Main and interaction effects as in Table 2’s 
Column 2 included Yes Yes  
Observations 31,497 31,423 
R-squared 0.186 0.177 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors – clustered at the personal identification level – are reported in 












Interviewed between 24/06/2016 and 23/08/2016 -0.013 0.001 
 (0.046) (0.093) 
Interviewed between 24/08/2016 and 23/10/2016 0.078 0.048 
 (0.051) (0.109) 
Interviewed after 23/10/2016  0.070 -0.234** 
 (0.055) (0.114) 
Referendum year (=1) 0.041 -0.160 
 (0.056) (0.118) 
Btw 24/06/2016 and 23/08/2016 × Ref Year -0.103 0.393** 
 (0.089) (0.181) 
Btw 24/08/2016 and 23/10/2016 × Ref Year -0.233** 0.480** 
 (0.115) (0.238) 
After 23/10/2016 × Ref Year -0.192 0.533** 
 (0.124) (0.254) 
Preference towards EU   
Leave the EU -0.024 -0.099 
 (0.032) (0.067) 
2-way interaction terms   
Btw 24/06/2016 and 23/08/2016 × Leave the EU -0.045 0.057 
 (0.060) (0.120) 
Btw 24/08/2016 and 23/10/2016 × Leave the EU -0.013 -0.093 
 (0.057) (0.119) 
After 24/10/2016 × Leave the EU -0.027 0.069 
 (0.054) (0.108) 
Ref year × Leave the EU -0.005 0.044 
 (0.036) (0.073) 
3-way interaction terms   
Btw 24/06/2016 and 23/08/2016 × Ref year × Leave the EU 0.069 -0.099 
 (0.067) (0.132) 
Btw 24/08/2016 and 23/10/2016 × Ref year × Leave the EU 0.096 -0.025 
 (0.065) (0.135) 
After 24/10/2016 × Ref year × Leave the EU 0.148** -0.153 
 (0.068) (0.137) 
Observations 35,260 35,171 
R-squared 0.189 0.180 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors – clustered at the personal identification level – are reported in 
parentheses. The control variables are the same as in Table 2. 
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Table 5: Sub-sample analysis: Men versus Women and Young versus Old: OLS regressions 
 
 Life satisfaction Mental distress 









Post-EU Ref in W8 -0.014 0.017 0.011 -0.009 0.029 -0.031 0.026 -0.028 
 (0.059) (0.053) (0.064) (0.050) (0.113) (0.113) (0.136) (0.100) 
Referendum year -0.006 -0.028 -0.061 0.008 -0.067 0.027 -0.189 0.058 
 (0.074) (0.065) (0.082) (0.060) (0.141) (0.143) (0.178) (0.123) 
Post-EU Ref in W8 × Referendum year -0.026 -0.190* -0.167 -0.089 0.039 0.557** 0.331 0.329* 
 (0.109) (0.103) (0.129) (0.093) (0.223) (0.227) (0.282) (0.194) 
Preference towards EU         
Leave the EU -0.010 -0.032 -0.093 -0.000 -0.123 -0.083 0.041 -0.131* 
 (0.047) (0.044) (0.060) (0.038) (0.091) (0.096) (0.132) (0.078) 
2-way interaction terms         
Post-EU Ref × Leave the EU -0.027 -0.030 0.096 -0.064 -0.016 0.045 -0.225 0.083 
 (0.061) (0.057) (0.077) (0.050) (0.117) (0.123) (0.168) (0.100) 
Ref year × Leave the EU -0.026 0.011 -0.039 -0.005 0.131 -0.029 -0.062 0.073 
 (0.053) (0.050) (0.068) (0.043) (0.099) (0.107) (0.150) (0.086) 
3-way interaction terms         
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Leave the EU 0.137* 0.078 0.071 0.117** -0.160 -0.005 0.094 -0.125 
 (0.071) (0.066) (0.090) (0.058) (0.134) (0.142) (0.199) (0.114) 
Observations 15,639 19,739 10,500 24,878 15,597 19,692 10,467 24,822 
R-squared 0.180 0.200 0.197 0.190 0.158 0.189 0.162 0.189 
 





Table 1A: Descriptive statistics, by wave 
 
 Wave 7 (2015) Wave 8 (2016) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Min Max 
Life satisfaction 18,064 5.298 1.421 1 7 18,114 5.256 1.437 1 7 
Mental distress (GHQ-
12: Caseness) 18,682 1.651 2.959 0 12 18,682 1.667 2.963 0 12 
Male 18,682 0.441 0.497 0 1 18,682 0.441 0.497 0 1 
Age 18,682 50.685 18.260 16 101 18,682 51.679 18.266 16 102 
Marital status           
Single and never 
married/in civil 
partnership 18,682 0.194 0.396 0 1 18,682 0.192 0.394 0 1 
Married 18,682 0.544 0.498 0 1 18,682 0.547 0.498 0 1 
In a registered same-
sex civil partnership 18,682 0.004 0.061 0 1 18,682 0.004 0.062 0 1 
Separated but legally 
married 18,682 0.015 0.121 0 1 18,682 0.014 0.116 0 1 
Divorced 18,682 0.067 0.251 0 1 18,682 0.068 0.252 0 1 
Widowed 18,682 0.068 0.251 0 1 18,682 0.070 0.256 0 1 
Separated from civil 
partner 18,682 0.000 0.007 0 1 18,682 0.000 0.021 0 1 
A former civil partner 18,682 0.000 0.007 0 1 18,682 0.000 0.010 0 1 
A surviving civil 
partner  18,682 0.000 0.007 0 1 18,682 0.000 0.010 0 1 
Living as couple 18,682 0.107 0.309 0 1 18,682 0.103 0.304 0 1 
Not reported 18,682 0.001 0.031 0 1 18,682 0.001 0.031 0 1 
Employment status           
In paid employment 
(full or part-time) 18,682 0.475 0.499 0 1 18,682 0.473 0.499 0 1 
Self employed 18,682 0.073 0.261 0 1 18,682 0.076 0.266 0 1 
Unemployed 18,682 0.035 0.184 0 1 18,682 0.033 0.178 0 1 
Retired 18,682 0.280 0.449 0 1 18,682 0.293 0.455 0 1 
On maternity leave 18,682 0.005 0.072 0 1 18,682 0.004 0.063 0 1 
Looking after family or 
home 18,682 0.042 0.200 0 1 18,682 0.041 0.197 0 1 
Full-time student 18,682 0.051 0.219 0 1 18,682 0.038 0.191 0 1 
Long-term sick or 
disabled 18,682 0.033 0.178 0 1 18,682 0.035 0.185 0 1 
On a government 
training scheme 18,682 0.001 0.024 0 1 18,682 0.000 0.013 0 1 
Unpaid worker in 
family business 18,682 0.001 0.026 0 1 18,682 0.001 0.023 0 1 
Working in an 
apprenticeship 18,682 0.001 0.037 0 1 18,682 0.001 0.038 0 1 
Doing something else 18,682 0.004 0.065 0 1 18,682 0.004 0.066 0 1 
Not reported 18,682 0.000 0.016 0 1 18,682 0.000 0.019 0 1 
Self-rated health 18,081 3.392 1.060 1 5 18,141 3.318 1.067 1 5 
Obtained A-levels 18,682 0.159 0.366 0 1 18,682 0.161 0.368 0 1 
Obtained a first degree 18,682 0.186 0.389 0 1 18,682 0.188 0.391 0 1 
Log of household 
income 18,189 7.795 0.582 
-





Number of own 










Preferences towards the EU   
Leave the EU 0.113*** 
 (0.022) 




Ratio of people who prefer to leave in 




















Separated from civil partner 0.051 
 (0.376) 
A surviving civil partner 0.084 
 (0.881) 








On maternity leave 0.015 
 (0.152) 
Looking after family or home 0.039 
 (0.054) 




Long-term sick or disabled -0.005 
 (0.063) 
On a government training scheme 0.067 
 (0.695) 
Unpaid worker in family business 0.350 
 (0.443) 
Working in an apprenticeship -0.138 
 (0.262) 
Doing something else -0.042 
 (0.141) 
Health: fair -0.006 
 (0.050) 
Health: good 0.038 
 (0.049) 
Health: very good 0.086* 
 (0.049) 
Health: excellent 0.074 
 (0.054) 
Highest education: A-level 0.067** 
 (0.028) 
Highest education: first degree or over 0.010 
 (0.027) 
Log of monthly household income -0.008 
 (0.020) 
Number of children age<16 0.011 
 (0.014) 
Region: North West -0.146** 
 (0.061) 
Region: Yorkshire and the Humberside -0.078 
 (0.063) 
Region: East Midlands -0.040 
 (0.064) 
Region: West Midlands -0.025 
 (0.063) 
Region: East of England -0.098 
 (0.062) 
Region: London 0.023 
 (0.066) 
Region: South East 0.003 
 (0.060) 
Region: South West -0.006 
 (0.062) 
Region: Wales -0.000 
 (0.062) 
Region: Scotland -0.062 
 (0.066) 
Region: Northern Ireland 0.040 
 (0.063) 










Table 3A: Placebo tests 
 
 Life satisfaction Mental distress 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Interviewed after 23/06/15 (i.e. Placebo treatment) -0.002   -0.025   
 (0.034)   (0.070)   
Interviewed post-EU Referendum in W8 (=1)  -0.017 -0.017  0.010 -0.040 
  (0.032) (0.033)  (0.065) (0.068) 
Base year = 2014       
Year = 2015 0.055** 0.061**  -0.106** -0.080*  
 (0.025) (0.024)  (0.050) (0.048)  
Base year = 2013   0.126***   -0.129** 
Year = 2014   (0.025)   (0.051) 
       
Placebo treatment × Year = 2015 0.022   0.028   
 (0.032)   (0.066)   
Post-EU Ref × Year = 2015  0.026   -0.004  
  (0.032)   (0.064)  
Post-EU Ref × Year = 2014   -0.009   0.095 
   (0.034)   (0.068) 
Preference towards EU       
Leave the EU -0.042 -0.041 -0.129*** -0.108 -0.045 0.149** 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.036) (0.070) (0.066) (0.075) 
2-way interaction terms       
Placebo treatment × Leave the EU 0.034   0.007   
 (0.044)   (0.088)   
Post-EU Ref × Leave the EU 0.038 0.076  -0.057 -0.124  
 (0.043) (0.046)  (0.085) (0.095)  
Year = 2015 × Leave the EU 0.024 0.017  -0.030 -0.040  
 (0.039) (0.038)  (0.076) (0.074)  
Year = 2014 × Leave the EU   0.093**   -0.191** 
   (0.040)   (0.079) 
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3-way interaction terms       
Placebo treatment × Year=2015 × Leave the EU -0.062   0.097   
 (0.051)   (0.098)   
Post-EU Ref × Year = 2015 × Leave the EU  -0.059   0.075  
  (0.050)   (0.096)  
Post-EU Ref × Year = 2014 × Leave the EU   -0.039   0.069 
      (0.053)     (0.102) 
Observations 34,140 35,268 34,220 34,032 35,153 34,140 
R-squared 0.156 0.155 0.142 0.166 0.167 0.156 
 
 Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors – clustered at the personal identification level - are reported in parentheses. Control variables are the same as in Table 2. 
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Table 4A: Balanced panel: OLS and FE regressions 
 
 Life satisfaction Mental distress 
VARIABLES OLS FE OLS FE 
Interviewed post-EU Referendum in W8 
(=1) 0.007  -0.021  
 (0.039)  (0.081)  
Referendum year (=1) 0.005 -0.063 -0.039 0.040 
 (0.049) (0.066) (0.102) (0.133) 
Interviewed post-EU Ref in W8 × Ref 
year -0.118 -0.084 0.332** 0.284* 
 (0.078) (0.081) (0.163) (0.168) 
Preference towards EU     
Leave the EU -0.023  -0.098  
 (0.032)  (0.067)  
Don't know 0.041  -0.252**  
 (0.059)  (0.117)  
Refusal/missing 0.023  -0.060  
 (0.076)  (0.169)  
2-way interaction terms     
Post-EU Ref × Leave the EU -0.027  0.017  
 (0.042)  (0.085)  
Post-EU Ref × Don't know -0.025  0.172  
 (0.109)  (0.237)  
Post-EU Ref × Refusal/missing -0.098  -0.011  
 (0.109)  (0.228)  
Ref year × Leave the EU 0.012 0.004 0.036 0.040 
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.074) (0.074) 
Ref year × Don't know -0.034 -0.054 0.102 0.084 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.133) (0.131) 
Ref year x Refusal/missing -0.110 -0.127 0.028 0.026 
 (0.122) (0.121) (0.256) (0.256) 
3-way interaction terms     
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Leave the 
EU 0.084* 0.061 -0.084 -0.051 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.099) (0.098) 
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Don't know 0.196 0.260* -0.158 -0.051 
 (0.132) (0.134) (0.278) (0.283) 
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × 
Refusal/missing 0.197 0.218 -0.508 -0.232 
 (0.182) (0.198) (0.370) (0.380) 
Observations 33,822 33,822 33,737 33,737 
R-squared 0.188  0.178  
Within R-squared  0.020  0.034 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors – clustered at the personal identification level - are reported in 






Table 5A: Redefining the treatment group 
 
 Life satisfaction Mental distress 
VARIABLES OLS FE OLS FE 
Interviewed after 23/06 in the survey year (=1) -0.002 -0.140* 0.177 -0.026 
 (0.057) (0.076) (0.118) (0.168) 
Referendum year (=1) -0.023 -0.113 0.121 0.056 
 (0.056) (0.069) (0.118) (0.142) 
Interviewed post-EU Ref in W8 × Ref year -0.112 0.002 0.180 0.250 
 (0.082) (0.093) (0.174) (0.191) 
Preference towards EU     
Leave the EU -0.019  -0.154**  
 (0.033)  (0.068)  
Don't know 0.016  -0.182  
 (0.062)  (0.122)  
Refusal/missing -0.034  -0.032  
 (0.082)  (0.182)  
2-way interaction terms     
Interviewed after 23/06 × Leave the EU -0.033 -0.023 0.104 0.202 
 (0.042) (0.081) (0.086) (0.165) 
Interviewed after 23/06  × Don't know 0.055 0.314 -0.068 0.003 
 (0.104) (0.219) (0.223) (0.383) 
Interviewed after 23/06 × Refusal/missing 0.005 0.368 -0.051 1.140** 
 (0.111) (0.294) (0.232) (0.522) 
Ref year × Leave the EU -0.009 0.001 0.097 0.067 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.076) (0.077) 
Ref year × Don't know 0.015 -0.026 -0.020 0.089 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.135) (0.135) 
Ref year x Refusal/missing -0.127 -0.049 0.011 0.276 
 (0.127) (0.139) (0.266) (0.306) 
3-way interaction terms     
Interviewed after 23/06  × Ref year × Leave the EU 0.109** 0.065 -0.161 -0.092 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.103) (0.104) 
Interviewed after 23/06 × Ref year × Don't know 0.065 0.195 0.169 -0.052 
 (0.131) (0.137) (0.288) (0.300) 
Interviewed after 23/06  × Ref year × Refusal/missing 0.220 0.117 -0.484 -0.564 
 (0.184) (0.212) (0.377) (0.421) 
Observations 35,378 35,378 35,289 35,289 
R-squared 0.189  0.179  
Within R-squared  0.021  0.034 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors – clustered at the personal identification level - are reported in 
parentheses. Control variables are the same as in Table 2. 
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Table 6A: Unpacked mental-stress regressions 
 
 GHQA GHQB GHQC GHQD 
Interviewed post-EU Ref in W8 × Ref year 0.032 0.075* 0.030 0.049** 
 (0.029) (0.043) (0.031) (0.025) 
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Leave the EU -0.029 -0.013 -0.012 -0.015 
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.020) (0.017) 
 GHQE GHQF GHQG GHQH 
Interviewed post-EU Ref in W8 × Ref year 0.130*** 0.087** 0.003 0.039 
 (0.041) (0.039) (0.031) (0.027) 
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Leave the EU -0.041 0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.020) (0.017) 
 GHQI GHQJ GHQK GHQL 
Interviewed post-EU Ref in W8 × Ref year 0.107** 0.102** 0.078** 0.031 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.037) (0.031) 
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Leave the EU -0.035 0.013 0.007 0.003 
 (0.027) (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors – clustered at the personal identification level - are reported in 
parentheses. Control variables are the same as in Table 2. GHQA = concentration; GHQB = loss of sleep; GHQC = 
playing a useful role; GHQD = capable of making decisions; GHQE = constantly under strain; GHQF = problem 
overcoming difficulties; GHQG = enjoy day-to-day activities; GHQH = ability to face problems; GHQI = unhappy or 




Table 7A: Subjective wellbeing and the Brexit effect: Linear pre-post comparison regressions 








VARIABLES OLS OLS 
Interviewed post-EU Referendum in W8 
(=1) -0.011 0.013 
 (0.062) (0.124) 
Referendum year (=1) 0.074 -0.057 
 (0.073) (0.153) 
Interviewed post-EU Ref in W8 × Ref 
year -0.225** 0.539** 
 (0.111) (0.248) 
Preference towards EU   
Leave the EU -0.085* -0.068 
 (0.045) (0.097) 
Don't know -0.004 -0.313** 
 (0.086) (0.158) 
Refusal/missing -0.053 0.016 
 (0.123) (0.267) 
2-way interaction terms   
Post-EU Ref × Leave the EU 0.062 -0.039 
 (0.059) (0.124) 
Post-EU Ref × Don't know 0.091 0.160 
 (0.165) (0.320) 
Post-EU Ref × Refusal/missing 0.000 0.035 
 (0.161) (0.379) 
Ref year × Leave the EU 0.026 0.058 
 (0.051) (0.107) 
Ref year × Don't know 0.015 0.106 
 (0.089) (0.166) 
Ref year x Refusal/missing -0.167 0.092 
 (0.162) (0.373) 
3-way interaction terms   
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Leave the 
EU 0.050 -0.189 
 (0.068) (0.144) 
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × Don't know 0.309* -0.543 
 (0.167) (0.417) 
Post-EU Ref × Ref year × 
Refusal/missing 0.344 -0.790 
 (0.225) (0.566) 
Observations 23,746 23,682 
R-squared 0.187 0.169 
 
Notes: *<10%; **<5%; ***<1%. Robust standard errors reported in parentheses. Control variables include gender, age, age-
squared, age-cubed, employment, education, marital status, average of log monthly income (W1-6), number of children, 
daily exchange rate (£/US$), monthly share prices, month of the interview, interview mode dummies (i.e., face-to-face, 
telephone or online) and regional fixed effects.   
